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Paradise defiled
The Bali bombings and the terror of
national identity
Jeff Lewis
RMIT University
abstract The spread of global Jihadist terrorism was brutally announced
in the 2002 Bali bombings. The attacks marked a significant moment in the
relationship between Australia and Bali. The bewilderment characterizing
Balinese and Australian responses to the 2002 bombings is linked to processes
of globalization and the ‘de-bordering’ of knowledge, most particularly as it
resonates through locally constituted ‘ideology’, beliefs and identity. While for
the Bali Hindu communities this cultural expressivity is located in Vedic
mythology, rituals and principles, for many Australians it appears to be
associated with various forms of political ideology and ‘nationalism’. It is
unsurprising that Australia’s first commemoration of the bombing was
iterated through a profound grief, rendered more acute by nationalism and
national pride. It heroized the victims through the heroization of nation; the
assailants were motivated by a desire not merely to destroy Australians and
Australia but the very basis of the modern nation itself – freedom, democracy,
justice and history.
keywords Bali bombings, bhuta kala, Gallipoli, nationalism, terrorism
In Balinese Hindu mythology the bhuta kala demons are not considered
intrinsically evil, nor are their spiritual nemeses considered entirely
wholesome. Rather, the dialectic of good and evil which characterizes
Balinese Vedic culture is formed through an eternal interdependence: evil
is not subjugated, redeemed or eradicated from the human body or
spiritual world more generally since it is the predicate of good. The
principle of rwa bhineda (two in one) conceives of good and evil in terms
of a mutual identification which seeks merely to minimize the harm that
evil may inflict on the living (and the dead). While in most instances the
Balinese have been able to maintain rwa bhineda, even through the shock
of rapid (post)modernization, the terrible events of 12 October 2002 have
severely strained the island people’s theological, ethical and social resolve.
Like the revenge massacres perpetrated against Chinese and Partai
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Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) sympathizers in
1965, the Bali bombings left the local people raw and disturbed. The
intensely devout and generally optimistic demeanour that the Balinese
appear to have marshalled against the threatening excess of rapid social
change seems to have been seriously strained by the bombings and their
aftermath (see Hitchcock and Putra, 2004).
For Australians the shock has been equally overwhelming. While not a
part of its sovereign territory, Bali has evolved certainly as a critical part
of Australia’s cultural imagining (Hamilton, 1990; Lewis, 1994; Vickers,
1990). In this sense, Bali is part of a cultural geography, a ‘third space’ as
Henri Lefebvre calls it, which operates through at least two distinguish-
able cultural flows. First, Bali exists as an imaginary land-bridge connect-
ing Australians to the region and the rest of the world. For many
Australians, Bali constitutes the first interface of global contact which is
not merely or exclusively generated by international popular culture: the
journey to the extraneous territory of Bali represents a ‘reaching out’ into
the world as opposed to being ‘reached for’ through domestic television,
movie or music consumption. Second, however, this movement out consti-
tutes its own countermove: that is, the reaching out is counterbalanced by
an equally forceful movement towards self-interrogation or ‘interiority’.
The otherness of space provides a cultural resource for self-reflection and
the exploration or expression of personal and collective identity.
Australians’ imaginative and bodily engagement with the cultural geog-
raphy of Bali facilitates new forms of self-expression. At this second level,
the journey to Bali is inevitably an expression of an overlapping imaginary
where the self and the other are sustained by communion, contingency and
new modes of cultural propinquity and change.
At this level, the notion of an integrated self becomes problematized,
reflecting a broader and quite central issue for the process of globalization.
As the movement across national and cultural borders creates these greater
contiguities, the social knowledge that references these departures and
modes of self-expression is also destabilized. As numerous commentators
have pointed out (e.g. Castells, 1997; Featherstone, 1995; Held, 1995), the
movement out towards greater cultural contiguities and modes of self-
expression seems both to problematize and foreground discourses of
localism, including various iterations of the state and nation. Undoubtedly,
the bewilderment that characterized Balinese and Australian responses to
the 12 October bombings is linked to this ‘de-bordering’ of knowledge,
most particularly as it resonates through locally-constituted ‘ideology’,
beliefs and identity. While for the Hindu communities in Bali this cultural
expressivity is located in Vedic mythology, rituals and principles, for many
Australians it appears to be associated with various forms of political
ideology and ‘nationalism’. In this context, it is not surprising that
Australia’s first commemoration of the bombing was iterated through a
profound grief, which was rendered more acute by the motifs of224
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nationalism and national pride. The commemoration, in fact, heroized the
victims through the heroization of nation; the assailants were motivated,
it seems, by a desire not merely to destroy Australians and Australia but
the very basis of the modern nation itself – freedom, democracy, justice
and history.
Just as George W. Bush had theologized the vengeance of Americans
over September 11 in terms of ‘infinite justice’ (Lewis, 2005; Nacos, 2002;
Silberstein, 2002; Tuman, 2003), so the Australian political leadership
transformed the actions of the Bali bombers into a mode of cosmic evil
perpetrated against innocent victims, the nation and ultimately ‘all
humanity’. Therefore Amrozi, one of the principal bombers, is demonized
in the same way as Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein as the ‘smiling
assassin’, the harbinger of all that is evil and offensive to human decency.
The Christian remembrance service telecast across Australia served
further to reinforce the mood of evangelism and moral outrage that has
inscribed itself as a national crusade. These discourses provide additional
cultural resources for those who would like to raise the bombings and
terrorism more generally as an issue of Islamicism and national security.
Of course, there is no diminishing the horror of the bombings, or the awful
guilt of the perpetrators. But there is a need to confront the ways in which
the atrocity is being contextualized, discussed and explained. The aim in
this article is to examine the Bali bombings in terms of culture and
identity, most especially around the problematics of nation and globaliz-
ation processes. By way of clarification, the notion of globalization is used
to refer broadly to the various directional flows associated with increasing
cultural and national contiguity. Globalization implicates, therefore, the
range of cultural meanings that are associated with financial and economic
exchange, communications flows and the movement of people. Tourism,
which is clearly implicated in the Bali bombings, remains a significant part
of globalization flows.
National psyche
The Gallipoli disaster is invoked frequently as a precipitous moment in
Australian cultural history.1 This strange and pointless colonial adven-
ture, by which Australia confirmed its fidelity to British military and
economic hegemony, has been shaped into a formidable motif for the
popular imagining of nation and national identity. While the disaster
exposes for many Australians the tragic deficiencies of an imperial
system, over time ‘Gallipoli’ has assumed an even greater epiphanal
power in the celebration of Australia as an independent, free and heroic
nation. The paradox of constituting a national ideology around a fatuous
and disastrous military failure has been noted often; as with the Eureka
disaster2 (ennobled as ‘rebellion’), Gallipoli allows Australians to imagine
an heroic imperial parturition, one which seems to valorize the status of 225
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the political victim. The invocation of Gallipoli during the Bali bombing
and commemorations resonates with a similar ideological motive, a desire
to transform the hideousness of the event into a discursive unity, a
triumph of national valour. For the official discourses of the state, the
Gallipoli–Bali analogue galvanizes the popular imagining against a
common enemy: the disparate sensibilities, practices, ethics and ideas that
constitute a social assembly are drawn together through an overarching
political postulate, one that affirms the ultimate authority and validity of
the state itself.
The poetic elegance of this unity, however, serves only to parenthesize
its component parts – its absences. The very invocation of Gallipoli as a
discourse which announces, as it obscures, the coercive authority of the
state, necessarily dislocates the internal language wars that compose it.
Thus, the seeming presence of this unity in the Gallipoli discourse
immediately unravels as it seeks to identify itself as the state: that is, as an
inviolable and absolute semiosis. The slightest glance at the internal
composition of the signifier ‘Gallipoli’ reveals that it is composed of agonis-
tic elements which may be read in a variety of ways. Thus, while Peter
Weir’s film Gallipoli (1981) might seem to synthesize the beach landing
through a romantic valorization of Australian ‘identity’, nevertheless the
composite elements continue to exist beyond the borders of a propagated
textual (and national) unity. There remains, for example, a series of
distinct tensions around the ethical and ideological validity of empire,
nation, class, gender, ethnicity and even violence itself. As Fredric Jameson
(1981) noted some time ago, these agonisms and textual elements pre-exist
their withdrawal into the absolute and constituted synthesis of ‘interpret-
ation’ or analysis (the secondary text). That is, the multiply-layered and
infinitely complex elements that made up the original experiences of
Gallipoli are reduced and synthesized in order to create Weir’s film text;
the film is then reduced further as it is interpreted by viewers and
critics. This flow to synthesis, however, is subverted by the pre-existence
of the elements that constitute it. The synthesized version of Gallipoli,
which might heroize Australia and its culture, must confront other
agonisms – for example, the military élite which functions through all
three nations to sacrifice the lives of common class soldiers as they protect
their own class interests; Australia’s military aggression, racism and
Orientalism; an imperialism which validates its territorial claims through
brutal coercion; a patriarchy which affirms power in masculine violence
and militarism; death and maiming, which become the shared borders of
individuals without regard to nation, ethnicity, class status or gender; and
a banality which exists as a neutral underpinning to the grand projects
of ideology.
However, these alternative linguistic tropes are themselves engaged in
a battle for primacy. Weir’s film – indeed all representations of Gallipoli
– must struggle internally and externally against the agonistic potential of226
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alternative meaning and semiotic dispersal. Of course, hegemonic social
groups seek to ‘enlist’ Gallipoli in the assertion of their own particular
interests and ideological order. For a range of reasons, Gallipoli appears to
be particularly susceptible to this sort of discursive conscription, combin-
ing as it does the possibility of heroic ascent with a (post-colonial) victim
consciousness that rails against an externally imposed iniquitous author-
ity. This conflux of opposite potential seems to facilitate the broader
convergence of state interest and popular imagining, a necessary precon-
dition for the maintenance of an essentially hierarchical social system. And
while this symbolic order is not as implacable as Althusser has claimed,
nevertheless it draws together its contingent agonisms into a ‘presence’
that allows for the subjugation of potential disorder. Paul Virilio (2002) has
suggested, in fact, that this subjugation has been pursued actively by a
military class whose historical project has been the domination of the
remainder of humanity. While Virilio’s claim may seem excessively total-
istic, one can say with some certainty that the state itself represents the
latest incarnation of social violence and coercion – militarism is the
constant of an hierarchical order which establishes itself in the cartogra-
phy of nation and empire. Concepts such as national ‘identity’, ‘conscious-
ness’ or ‘psyche’ (Anderson, 1991) are part of the grand signification of
modernization.
In Australia, this process of becoming modern is necessarily implicated
in the formation and expression of militarism. Having been established for
principally military and strategic reasons, the colonies of Australia partici-
pated in a number of extraterritorial campaigns well before federation and
Gallipoli. Under the imperial banner, colonial troops fought against Zulus,
Sudanese, Boers, Chinese Boxers, Indians and Maoris. Since federation, the
Australian military has fought against a range of Muslims and ‘Orientals’
in Afghanistan, Iraq (twice), Japan, Korea, Kosovo and Vietnam. While
Australia’s sovereign territory has been threatened only once since British
settlement (during the Second World War), it has continued to centre its
security policies on a perceived threat, most frequently associated with Asia
and Islam – China, Indonesia and North Korea. Not surprisingly, this mili-
tarism has both propagated and responded to a somewhat diffuse sense of
national anxiety, appending itself to the perceived greatness of ‘natural’
allies, the United Kingdom and the United States. This ‘great and powerful
friends’ foreign policy has expressed itself culturally and psychologically
as a sense of presence within the perpetual imagining and re-imagining
of an East–West divide.
As it is forged into contemporary discourses, Gallipoli seems to reinvig-
orate this otherwise precarious ‘presence’ constantly. For example, on the
commemoration of the Bali bombings, the premier of Victoria, Steve
Bracks, made explicit the link between Gallipoli and the national psyche.
Terrorism becomes the new unnamed enemy of the state and the values
which Gallipoli represents: 227
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Not only did it bring terrorism to our doorstep, it has led to the indelible mark
on our national psyche . . . Like Gallipoli, it’s my hope that the lasting legacy
of Bali will be a peaceful and unifying one. (quoted in Dubecki, 2003: 15)
Within a resurgent East–West divide, Bracks’ reading of history clearly
situates the perpetrators of the bombing with the adversary in the
Gallipoli context. The conservative commentator, Piers Akerman, invokes
the spirit of Gallipoli and the ‘unifying’ effects of nation in his account of
the commemoration, published in Sydney’s Sunday Telegraph:
Next Sunday, we will mark the first anniversary of the Bali bombing,
Australia’s shock introduction to the nightmare world of Islamic terrorism . . .
The scars are still fresh. There’s no doubt we are a vastly changed nation.
Although Bali can’t be ranked with Gallipoli on a scale of national disasters,
nor the losses compared with the wholesale slaughter of World War I, the raw
immediacy of the coverage ensured that images of survivors stumbling from
the burning ruins of the Sari Club have been seared into the national psyche.
(Akerman, 2003: 2)
This radical inscription on the national psyche is as much a ‘loss of
innocence’ (‘The No-Longer-Lucky Country’, 2002: 32) as a realization
that: ‘As Australians, we are faced with the reality of having the world’s
largest Islamic nation on our doorstep . . . [with] a highly volatile system
of government’ (Akerman, 2003: 2). Whereas the Turks are situated safely
in another hemisphere, the contiguity of Indonesian Islamists poses a more
immediate and inescapable threat: it is the mere fact that these are
‘Muslims’ in our near north which constitutes a significant danger to
Australia’s national security.
This ‘threat’ is identified also by the Zionist Federation of Australia,
whose own polemical interests were clearly stimulated by the bombings.
Not long after the Bali attacks the Federation Newsletter published the
following poem:
You hurt us bombing Bali, but we can take the pain,
But if you think you’ll beat us, then you can think a-bloody-gain,
We battled at Gallipoli and we fought the bloody hun,
Of all the arseholes we’ve had to face, you’re just another one. (Holland, 2002)
Thus the Jewish diaspora is mobilized into the mysterious convocation
of a national unity that translates Islamic militantism into the common
threat. In this sense, Gallipoli symbolizes a shared destiny in which the
complex diversity of individuals and communities in Australia are gal-
vanized through a unitary imaginary, most particularly as it is articulated
through an invigorated East–West (Muslim–West) divide. The Bali
bombings are another iteration by which nation can express itself against228
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the agonistic counterflows of diffuse interests and individual perspectives
and values.
The age of terror
Many commentators locate the period following the French Revolution as
the etymological source of political terror. According to Walter Laqueur
(1987, 2003), the ‘reign of terror’ marks a moment in the evolution of
modern politics and the modern state when raw power dominates the rule
of law. While Hoffman (1998) has identified significant changes to the
ways in which the concept of ‘terrorism’ has been used since the 18th
century, nevertheless we can see some continuities between the reign of
terror and what Laqueur calls the current ‘age of terror’. In particular, the
violence of the Revolution quickly shifted its target from the aristocracy
to other citizens whose values or social allegiances may have transgressed
the perceived interests of the self-constituting ruling party. Ordinary
citizens were subjected to perpetual menace, including the removal of
property and the threat of torture and death. Ideology and ethical systems
were shuffled around as citizens sought to align themselves with any postu-
late or political group who could secure them against this brutality. This
enjoinment of politics and violence actually percolated the dangers
throughout the community; terror became a political instrument that
combined persuasion with occasional and actual violence.
Of course, there is nothing new about this deployment of threat and
violence in political management, most especially by rulers over subjects
or warriors over workers. However, the emergence of the modern state and
notions of citizenship demonstrates how power can be broadly dispersed
through an increasingly urbanized mass society. Foucault (1991) has
identified this shift in modes of social management, suggesting that the
modern state, which is created through hierarchical systems of material
exchange, has evolved highly precise strategies (technologies) of control
that maintain order. Somewhat paradoxically, this evolving process of a
widely-dispersed system of ‘governmentality’ may derive in fact from the
embryo of threatened disorder by which citizens access and deliver power
through terror. The French Revolution illustrated how the relationship
between state and citizen is underscored by a mutual predisposition of
violence: political thinkers from Auguste Comte to James and John Stuart
Mill, Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold recognized that the potential
for ‘democracy’ and ‘representation’ was necessarily and precariously
balanced through the violent potential of this relationship. Social and
political order must rest upon a fulcrum that balances authority and access,
state and citizen. In this sense, Hoffman’s view that terror has moved from
the state to the populace is dubious since, as is argued here, all power in
the modern state is effected through a process of exchange. The radical
irruption of ‘social order’ by the secretive forces of terror is already 229
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inscribed in the notion of statehood: democracy becomes part of a fluid
motion of orderly and disorderly engagements of power, threat, persuasion
and coercion.
Democracy, therefore, enshrines the rights and freedoms of the citizen
within a political context of vulnerability: the citizen is vulnerable to the
violence and persuasion of the state, as the state is vulnerable to the
violence and freedoms of the individual (Lewis, 2003). It is precisely this
vulnerability which draws terror from its historical and discursive shadows
as a military and political instrument of violence. Clearly, a democratic
order that privileges hierarchies of obedience and control necessarily
marginalizes specific perspectives, discourses and social formations. The
notional ‘majority’ masks its absent other by excluding contrary views,
especially radical views, from its discursive ambit. Political violence in Fiji,
India, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Sri Lanka and the US (Waco, TX) are
all associated with the limits of a democratic system by which the state
and its ‘majority’ seek to impose their will over aggrieved social groups
who feel their views are not being adequately ‘represented’. At this point,
the distinction between political and military strategy becomes function-
ally blurred.
In a (post)modernizing world characterized by broad flows of people,
information, imagery, products and finance, the problems associated with
the ‘representation’ of political interests are significantly exacerbated
(Castells, 1997; Held, 1995; Zolo, 1997). The targeting of the US in the
September 11 attacks is clearly related to the problematics of US cultural,
military and economic hegemony which, of itself, is part of the outward
expression of nation and its hierarchical systems, including the ideology
of liberal democracy. This internationalization of the ‘democratic state’
carries with it the same inscriptions of power, ‘majority’ and vulnerability
of citizens. However (and as I have explained in greater detail elsewhere,
see Lewis, 2002), the internationalization of national hegemony will
marginalize further the interests, rights, needs and political aspirations of
other discourses and social groups who do not necessarily subscribe to the
dominant order. At this level, the globalization of economy and culture
exposes the host of internationalization to the terror of political violence.
The deficiencies of democracy that are evident within nations become
extraterritorialized, as national hegemonies seek to maximize their
constituent advantages within a globalizing hierarchy of interests. As it
goes out into the world, liberal democracy assumes its primacy over all
other ideologies and interests.
Specifically, while these marginalized groups are encased within the
global influence of the US, they are neither ‘represented’ in US decision-
making nor the electoral processes that affirm their legitimacy: they are
not part of the US ‘electoral’ ambit. This globalizing of influence without
a commensurate globalizing of representation (Zolo, 1997) is clearly prob-
lematic. Various international and national military and political codes230
e u ro p e a n  j o u r n a l  o f  c u lt u r a l  st u d i e s  9 ( 2 )
06_063165_Lewis (JB-D)  29/3/06  3:12 pm  Page 230
have sought to neutralize its potential dangers by criminalizing specific
modes of political opposition: violent opposition, particularly that which
targets ‘non-combatants’, is situated within a legal and juridical discourse.
In US law, for example, terrorism is defined as ‘premeditated, politically
motivated violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups
or clandestine agents’ (22 USCA 2656 (d) 1990, supp. 2000). This definition
is clearly marking the illegality of ‘sub-national’ groups against the legit-
imacy of nation and a state-based rule of law, most particularly where the
state is founded on democratic principles and universal codes of human
rights (Laqueur, 1987).
Noam Chomsky (2001) argues, however, that the US’s own official
strategy of ‘low intensity warfare’ as it is explained in various military
manuals, including the ‘US Code’, actually constitutes a form of strategic
terrorism. This strategy includes ‘coercion of civilians’, which may result
in death and the destruction of social and material infrastructure such as
transportation lines, communications, hospitals and so forth. As Chomsky
points out, this is precisely the strategy adopted by those who destroyed
the World Trade Center. Moreover, there can be little doubt that covert
and overt CIA operations in places such as Nicaragua and the Sudan fit
clearly within the US’s own definitional boundaries of ‘terrorism’. As many
commentators have noted, the identification of terrorism and terrorists is
largely a contingency of power: those groups with greater access and
control over discourse and meaning-making, especially the mass media,
are more likely to have their perspectives generated and heard. The
hierarchical system and political privileging of ‘majorities’ facilitate the
propagation of sectoral interest, including the privileged distinction
between ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom fighter’. The American ‘War on Terror’ is
declared by the victims of the violence against the perpetrators. Not
surprisingly, the accusation has been returned by those who have suffered
during American reprisal attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq. Similarly,
both the Palestinians and Israelis are accusing each other of a terrorist
violence which targets ‘innocent citizens’, including women and children.
Brigitte Nacos (2002) argues that a critical dimension of this process of
labelling is communicational (see also Laqueur, 1987, 2003; Tuman, 2003).
Following Sisela Bok’s (1998) examination of media violence as crime-
based entertainment, Nacos argues that terrorists are not so much
concerned with the victims as the informational impact of their deeds. The
terrorists are not arbitrary or motivated by petty material gain; rather, they
seek to communicate specific messages through the mass mediation of
brutal and frightening details (Nacos, 2002). In this way, the mass media
is absolutely implicated in the political activities of the terrorist
organization:
The starting point is the notion of mass mediated terrorism and its definition
as political violence against noncombatant/innocents that is committed with 231
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the intention to publicize the deed, to gain publicity and thereby public and
government attention. (Nacos, 2002: 17)
This emphasis on the significance of the media acknowledges the
substantive link between material and discursive dimensions of political
violence and the exercise of power. As has been noted previously, the status
of citizen and state are mutually contingent, forming around the respec-
tive possibilities of violence, coercion and persuasion. In this context, all
violence is persuasive and all persuasion carries with it the potential for
violence, threat or terror, since it ultimately references a violent state and
its overarching assertion of authority. Nevertheless, the regulatory regime,
which would parade the state in terms of a democratic legitimacy, is
inscribed with the ‘vulnerability’ of the citizen-to-state and state-
to-citizen. Questions as to whether the state and its vast machinery of
violence can commit acts of terror become largely redundant. Indeed, in
Virilio’s terms, the threat of violence is the critical foundation of the state
itself; notions of legitimacy and illegitimacy are less relevant than the
history of institutionalization which continues to ennoble aggression as it
perpetuates an imaginary of violence that is represented through a broad
range of mediated discourses. Therefore, the ubiquity of violence in the
media has become a matter of cultural exigency, providing the rhetorical
resources not merely for the authorization of social order but for terrorism
as a generalized mode of political expression (see Tuman, 2003).
Thus the mass media is not so much an arm of the state, as Chomsky
and others have claimed; rather, it is the conduit for the exchange of
persuasive perspectives and discourses along with their imaginary of
violence. Jean Baudrillard has suggested that, in fact, our entire reality has
been transformed by the proliferation and ascendancy of mass-mediated
imagery. If this is the case (and one suspects that it is), then the violence
that is now a mainstay of popular mediated culture, particularly as it is
generated through American television and cinema, conditions a hyper-
real consciousness which anticipates a perpetual volition of socially consti-
tuted threat. I have argued elsewhere (Lewis, 2002, 2003) that this mode
of televisual culture concentrates the possibilities of human expressivity
through the formation of the world-as-picture. Extending Heidegger’s
arguments about the world picture, it is suggested further that the presen-
tation of televisual violence is an inevitable corollary of televisual politics,
whereby the spectacle of polemic (Debord, 1995) inscribes itself on the
popular consciousness. At this level, politics is always associated with the
popular imaginary and popular culture (music, film, television, narrative)
and is not located simply in institutional processes, debates and rationali-
ties. Political debate, including debate around warfare and terror, is gener-
ated through visual stimuli and a symbolic ordering that interpolates as it
elicits public engagement and judgement. The mediation of terror is
generated fundamentally through this televisual public sphere. As Susan232
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Carruthers (2000) has noted, the successful waging of war in a modern
democratic state is precisely a contingency of this tripartite engagement of
state, mass media and public opinion: the definition and identification of
‘terrorism’ is critically bound to its hyperreal democratic cultural context.
Globalization and the spirit of terror
Baudrillard (1995) has argued famously that the Gulf War did not take
place. While this claim outrages many critics (e.g. Norris, 1992), in essence
Baudrillard is suggesting that the American attack on Iraq should not be
called a ‘war’: first, because the two sides of the conflict were so unevenly
matched; second, because the official US military imaging of the ‘attack’
profoundly distorted the event, constituting it for world TV audiences as a
‘war without death’. Following the September 11 attack on New York,
Baudrillard broadened these arguments, suggesting that American domi-
nation of the hyperreal global ‘system’ was of itself the essence or spirit of
terrorism. This global domination manifests itself primarily through the
hyperreality of media communications, but is critically linked also to
American military and economic primacy – this is the essence of globaliz-
ation. This is not merely to say, as Noam Chomsky and others might, that
American foreign policy contributed to the attack on New York; it is rather
to suggest that the actual existence of a single and unitary global super-
power constitutes its own predicate of violence. Foucault has said some-
thing similar, of course, in arguing that power generates its own inevitable
opposition. However, for Baudrillard, it is the sheer singularity and mass
of this power which of itself cannot be directly and genuinely opposed,
altered or exchanged. The terrorism that assaults the megapower of US
global domination is merely reactive, an inevitable response to singularity
itself:
To a system whose very excess of power poses an insoluble challenge, the
terrorists respond with a definitive act which is also not susceptible of
exchange. Terrorism is the act which restores an irreducible singularity to the
heart of a system of generalized exchange. All the singularities (species, indi-
viduals and cultures) that have paid with their deaths for the installation of a
global circulation governed by a single power are taking their revenge today
through this terroristic situational transfer. (Baudrillard, 2002: 9)
Like particles of dust being cast up by the monster’s own feet, this
terrorism may assault the eyes of globalization. In this sense it is ‘terror
against terror’, although without the density of ideas or ideology. There-
fore, in a hyperreal cultural condition the triumph of globalization leads
inevitably to a battle against itself. This ‘Fourth World War’, as Baudrillard
defines the current agonisms, is not a battle of ideologies or a clash of
civilizations (Huntington, 1996), but rather it is the world (or globe) 233
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battling against the inevitable flows of globalization. In other words, it is
a world system in which power is both feeding on and attacking itself – ‘if
Islam dominated the world, terrorism would rise against Islam’
(Baudrillard, 2002: 12).
The spirit of terrorism, therefore, is to be found in its momentous and
inclusive progression. While other commentators concern themselves with
the details of political or military conflict, Baudrillard’s more ontological
enquiry seeks to expose the force that lies behind US globalization. Achiev-
ing an even more theological epiphany, Baudrillard argues that good and
evil work simultaneously towards the same political ends:
We believe naively that the progress of Good, its advance in all fields (the
sciences, technology, democracy, human rights), corresponds to a defeat of Evil.
No one seems to have understood that Good and Evil advance together, as part
of the same movement. The triumph of the one does not eclipse the other . . .
Good does not conquer Evil, nor indeed does the reverse happen: they are at
once both irreducible to each other and inextricably interrelated. (Baudrillard,
2002: 13)
Baudrillard may well be accused of hyperbole and excessive generaliza-
tion. Even so, these arguments derive from the author’s consistent interest
in Gnostic-Manichean philosophy. According to Jonathan Smith (2004),
Baudrillard’s approach distinguishes terrorism as a form of ‘pure appear-
ance’ – the manifestation of what he calls ‘hyperreality’ in his earlier
writings. This pure appearance resembles the ‘pre-consciousness’ in
Lacanian theory, although for Baudrillard it is the pure appearance of the
‘ephemeral moment in which things take the time to appear before taking
on meaning or value’ (1987: 88). Baudrillard argues that it is through this
state of pure appearance that humanity is exposed to a profound moral and
spiritual ambiguity. Terrorism, which merely responds to the excess of
globalization, constitutes a form of pure appearance, at least in as much as
it is a functionally communicational act that has neither substance nor
clarity.
Baudrillard’s ideas have a distinct relevance to our discussions here,
most particularly in terms of the relationships between state and citizen
and democracy and violence. The positive effects of (post)modernization
seem inevitably to implicate negative effects, including a violence that is
inscribed in the actual legitimacy of the state and processes of economic
and cultural globalization. More broadly, however, the Gnostic notion of a
‘corrupted’ cosmos that is bound perpetually to the wheel of moral and
spiritual combat clearly parallels the Hindu concept of rwa bhineda. As was
noted previously, the Hindu cosmos is characterized by an unceasing
conflict between the two often indistinguishable forces of good and evil.
At this level, the bewilderment experienced by the Balinese during and
after the 12 October bombings might be associated with Baudrillard’s234
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reading of globalization and the implacable contiguity of Manichean
intensities. Thus, while the Balinese have experienced considerable pain
over the bombings, this pain has not expressed itself as vengeance against
‘evil’ Muslims, even though this was widely feared and predicted by many
western commentators (see Connor and Vickers, 2003). As I read it, the
rather subdued and even apologetic demeanour of most Balinese reflects a
continuing fidelity to rwa bhineda as well as an extraordinary adaptabil-
ity which has characterized them throughout the period of (post)modern-
ization. Unlike the US, UK and other forces that invaded Afghanistan and
Iraq, the Balinese were not prepared to sacrifice innocent Muslims for the
sake of revenge against terrorist perpetrators. To this extent, they seem to
recognize that evil itself is neither so easily defined nor contained and that
being Muslim was not tantamount to being guilty. Perhaps this insight into
the complexity of evil also explains partly the absence of looting during
the aftermath of the bombings. Despite the relative poverty of many
Balinese and the extreme vulnerability of many of the shops in the Legian
Street area, the Balinese devoted themselves to assistance, reparation and
libations that might protect the community against further outbreaks of
evil. The capture and trials of the suspected perpetrators were part of a
precise strategy that would constrain evil effects.
This is not to suggest that the Balinese are not capable of considerable
violence; on the contrary, Balinese history is replete with narratives of
extreme violence and brutality (Cribb, 1990) which belie the notion of
‘Bali harmony’ – a government and community-sponsored discourse
designed to promote Bali as a safe and ‘spiritually transcendent’ tourist
destination (Lewis, 1994; Reuter, 2003; Vickers, 1990). Even so, the poten-
tial for violence, most particularly an outbreak of latent but ongoing ethnic
and community tensions, has been restricted largely to a few skirmishes
and grievances over internal migration (Hitchcock and Putra, 2004; Lewis
and Lewis, 2004; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2003).
Certainly, the presence of significant numbers of internal (mostly Muslim)
migrants seeking work in the tourism areas of Kuta-Legian has
compounded the historical sense of isolation experienced by many Hindu
Balinese (Lewis and Lewis, 2004). However, rather than express these
anxieties through a violent xenophobia, the Balinese appear to have drawn
together the seemingly opposing effects of tradition and (post)modern
cultural and economic pragmatism. In particular, rwa bhineda has
provided a forum for the Balinese in which the forces of evil can be
engaged and contained without the expectation of victory or absolute
resolution.
Thus, the Balinese response to the bombing expresses an identity that
is mediated through the ethical and theological principles of a substantial
cultural heritage and the evolving effects of (post)modernization.
Whatever their own potential for violence, it is largely constituted through
this interface of history and contemporary conditions. As if to test 235
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Baudrillard’s theory, the absorption of Balinese culture and geography into
American-dominated globalization has reconfigured the ‘meaning’ of Bali
in terms of the symbolic capital of international tourism. Accommodating
over 1 million international tourism arrivals a year, Bali is imagined
frequently as a paradise of aesthetic, spiritual and sensuous liberation
(Vickers, 1990). For Australians, in particular, Bali has come to represent
a propinquity of’ ‘Oriental’ pleasure and self-reflection, a place in which
the exotic ‘other’ can be experienced through various gradients of immer-
sion. Clearly, Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club were bombed not merely
because they were ‘soft’ targets, but because they symbolized the globaliz-
ing effect of commodified imagining. The global capital and cosmopolitan
lifestyle, which are symbolized in the 22 nationalities of the dead, have
become the ensigns of moral and ideological decadence for the terrorist
attackers. There is a dramatic dissonance between the imagining of the
victims and that of the perpetrators. These mostly ‘first world’ citizens,
trapped in the throes of their pleasure, become ideal targets for organiz-
ations such as Jamaah Islamiyah because they are so entirely oblivious to
the violence upon which their privilege is founded.
While Jamaah Islamiyah had focused its attacks previously on Indo-
nesian Christians (UNDP, 2003), the switch to western targets and Bali
was based upon the militants’ belief that the island represented the
excesses and degradation of westernization in Indonesia. The death of
Balinese workers in the nightclubs was justified because the Balinese had
become servile to western decadence. However, from the other side, the
Balinese were barely visible to western governments, public officials and
media reports which tended to generalize or obscure the fate of the
Balinese in terms of a general Indonesian threat. This reading tended to
embed the Balinese within a broader conflation of Jamaah Islamiyah’s
estimated 3000 operatives with a population of 200 million Indonesian
Muslims: the pure appearance of the Balinese in the Australian imagi-
nary became a kind of ‘disappearance’ within a broadly articulated fear
of the northern threat. In fact, the Balinese exist in a realm that is slightly
between and beyond the propagated distinctions of Islam and the West.
While observing the imperatives of a Muslim-dominated statehood, Bali
has been conscripted into the global economy of international tourism.
Through the simultaneous movement of national integration and post-
modern globalization, Bali has had to mediate its own Hindu localisms
through an accommodating and flexible cultural evolution (Hitchcock and
Putra, 2004, Lewis and Lewis, 2004). Experiencing both the pleasures
and vicissitudes of rapid social change and (post)modernization, Bali and
Balinese identity are created through a continuing dialogue of good and
evil effects.
In fact, Bali has never evolved a ‘nationalist’ perspective, since it has
been largely an indifferent conscript into the Javanese national hegemony
(Connor and Vickers, 2003). The localism that it expresses is refracted236
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through the multiple prisms of globalization. This transformation of
opposing movements more clearly parallels the Australian experience and
is perhaps one reason for the relative comfort that has characterized its
respective postmodernizing experiences. At the level of personal inter-
action, cultural exchange and business, the relationship between the
Balinese and Australians has been remarkably positive. Paradoxically,
perhaps, the violence perpetrated by Jamaah Islamiyah might seem to
affirm the contiguity of the Australian tourists and their Balinese hosts,
not merely because they were occupying a common cultural space at
Paddy’s Bar or the Sari Club, but because they were both agents of a new
globalizing cultural order – or disorder. For all their significant differ-
ences, the Balinese and Australians share in the effects of cultural de-
bordering and fragmentation, which implicates the problematization of
notions of nation and national psyche. The terrorist attacks associated
with al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah are more than a ‘clash of funda-
mentalisms’ as they are described by Tariq Ali (2003). They are an
attempt by the contending powers to purify the cultural flow, to
(re-)establish a singularity that sustains a dominant directional order
against the counterflow of fragmentation. Just as the proponents of the
modern state set out to fix the flow of culture against the fragmentary
potential of local communities or individuals, so the forces of globaliz-
ation seek to move the direction of culture towards its own centre, against
dispersal and a profusion of counterflows. The ‘clash’ is not merely of one
version of globalism against another, US liberalism against Islamic funda-
mentalism. It is also a clash between the superflows of domination and
the infinitude of alternative human potential which also clashes within
itself. In this sense, terrorism has no centre but is a progression of human
expressivities or language wars that are predicated on the legitimacy of
violence (Lewis, 2005).
The nation remains forceful within a globalizing system only inasmuch
as it serves the interests of globalization itself: that is, when the instrument
of violence that is inscribed in the relationship between the state and the
citizen can be mobilized in support of domination. Against the fragmen-
tary potential of individuals with open identities, the nation-state imposes
its will in a discourse of ‘value’, especially economic value. Thus, the propo-
nents of economic globalization are seeking to dissolve the inevitable side-
effects of their own internationalization, most particularly the formation
of new cultural contiguities and discourses of fragmentation and disper-
sal. The Balinese and Australians who have worked most comfortably
together in forming some of these new discourses are forced continually
to reconcile them against the ‘superflows’ of a global domination and the
violence inscribed in state and citizenship. For the Balinese, the symbol-
ogy of Pancasila might be equated to the historical celebrationism of
Gallipoli, both of which glorify the unity of nation within the shrine of
violence, warfare and death. 237
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Conclusion: the forge of national identity
Tom Nairn has suggested that Australia’s grief over the bombings is
shaped, at least in part, by an incomplete identity. According to Nairn,
Australia has ‘no history’ and so its identity is largely unformed:
The communication of a nation’s victims is always a mobilisation of the past,
to reinforce the future flowing out of it. But where the past ‘we’ remains inde-
cisive or questioned, the mourning is also a kind of question-mark. In Australia
it asks who the bereft now want to be, or to become. (2002: 3)
Nairn goes on to ask whether globalization will intensify or abrogate the
need for the solidification of identity, most particularly for a nation which
is barely embryonic. While Nairn overlooks the complexity of the hybrid
national history of Australia, nevertheless the questions that he poses are
pertinent for both Australia and Bali. In fact, while the Balinese might
seem to have a relatively homogenous cultural heritage, clearly the co-
alescence of the cosmopolitan lifestyle and the village social reality, as
Connor and Vickers (2003) describe it, has pluralized the islanders’ indi-
vidual and collective identities almost beyond recognition. While tourists
from Australia and elsewhere may continue to seek the ‘authentic’
Balinese Vedic experience occasionally, even this authenticity is a hybrid
of propagated imaginaries forming through village rituals and a hotel
economy. More than anything else, the cultural exchange between
Australia and Bali has contributed to even broader hybridizing forms. In
this sense, the Bali bombings were as much an expression of mutual
ongoing cultural inscribing as they were an example of a new East–West
cultural divide. The language wars that underlie all culture and become
spectacularly exigent in periods of significant propinquity and rapid
change represent a broad field of shifts, battles and realignments: the
horror of the bombings emerges not just from the maiming and death but
also in the parallel shock of its inevitability.
It is perhaps for this reason that the commemoration of the Bali
bombings and the persistent invocation of Gallipoli seems so incomplete.
Of course, for the survivors and family members who were directly
affected by the bombing, the official commemoration ceremony in Bali
must have seemed a significant public acknowledgement of their grief,
bringing with it a sense of solidarity, community support and sympathy.
These things are very important. But in the nationally-inscribed gestures,
there was something critically missing. Perhaps in the various Hindu and
hybrid community ceremonies that have been held almost continually
since the bombings, including ceremonies conducted by the respective
surfing communities, there emerges a stronger sense of parallel destiny, a
shared humanity that is not deluded or by the imaginary primacy and
purposefulness of state, nation and globalization. Perhaps, in fact, the238
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better part of globalization – that more tolerant and mutually informing
cultural engagement and interflow of sensibilities – seems to have been
expressed through an ongoing expiation of the good–evil compound. It
appears that the idealism that brought many artists, backpackers and
surfers to the island in the 1960s and 1970s seems resurgent in these cere-
monies and other modes of community support. While official discourses
in Australia continue to ignore the plight of the Balinese and while high-
end tourism has largely deserted the island, the lower-walled Australian
travellers are resuming their occupation of an idealized, hybrid culture.
My son had been a regular visitor to the Sari Club not long before the
bombings. When I imagine the horror of the event, I think very directly
of our own extraordinary good fortune. But I also feel embittered by the
invocation of Gallipoli. I wonder how this trajectory of violence might be
interrupted and I think with deep grief about the people who have been
maimed, killed and bereaved. I think of the terror of the victims in the
last few moments in that hideous inferno. And I think of the shock and
poverty of the Balinese people themselves and the ways in which their own
cultural integrity has been sullied. Beyond these sufferings, however, I
wonder whether we are capable of looking squarely at the violence that is
fundamentally inscribed in the state and its relationship with citizens,
because it is this violence more than anything else which threatens our
security. It is a violence based on a hierarchy of value, an ordering that
delimits individuals and social groups, creating formidable allegiances of
discursive and material power – exchanging the privilege of the few for
the exclusion of others. The invocation of Gallipoli might make sense if
the flaws of this hierarchy of allegiance were to be exposed against the
imagining of violence. If this violence were exposed, then the better part
of globalization might depose intrinsic and fallacious commemorations:
events such as Gallipoli and the Bali bombings would be exposed as tragic
consequences of statehood and its new global expressivity. In this case, we
would view the perpetrators of the bombings in the same light as all pro-
ponents of extreme violence, including the state. If this were possible, then
oppressive policies and violent reactions may be preventable.
Note
1. The military campaign at Gallipoli, on the coast of Turkey, took place in
the First World War. The Allied command decided to open a new front
against the Germans and to neutralize the military capacity of the Ottoman
Empire (Turkey, significant parts of the Balkans and the Arabian
subcontinent, including Israel, Yemen and Iraq). The Australian and New
Zealand forces operated under the command of the British; in the two
phases of the campaign, April and August 1915, the Anzac troops were
decimated as they attempted to invade the Ottoman territory. In a clear
miscalculation of the enemy’s capacities and strategic advantage, the British
command ordered the troops into a beach landing that made them easy 239
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targets for the Turkish artillery, which was positioned in the cliffs above the
landing cove. Innumerable Anzac troops were slaughtered, many before
they had even set foot on land. While this was an inglorious military defeat,
it nevertheless marks the first major military campaign for the infant
nations of Australia and New Zealand; the campaign is ‘celebrated’ in
national holidays in both countries. However, as well as marking the
military arrival of the Anzacs in global warfare, Gallipoli is also seen as the
moment in which the limits of the ‘mother country’ and the ideals of the
British Empire are exposed. Australians, in particular, have a paradoxical
relationship with the former colonial ‘mother’; Gallipoli demonstrated the
need for some level of independent, national interest that may diverge from
the interests and command of the imperial parent.
2. During the Australian gold rushes of the 1850s, the colonial government in
Victoria sought to extract greater revenues from the diggers by imposing an
excessively expensive fossickers licence. Australia’s only significant armed
political rebellion occurred at Ballarat in 1854, when miners constructed a
stockade in order to resist these and other ‘oppressive’ laws. In the clashes
that followed, around 22 miners and six soldiers were killed. The stockade
is said to have laid the foundations for Australia’s democracy movement.
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